



DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

OLC 70-0169

March 2, 1970

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MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Highlights of Symington Subcommittee Hearings on
 Korea (3), Thursday Morning, February 26, 1970

DISTRIBUTION:

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 J
 S/S
 EA - Ambassador Green
 - Ambassador Brown
 - Mr. Moore
 EA/K - Mr. Peters
 L/EA - Mr. Futterman
 PM - Mr. Spiers
 PM/JW - Mr. Wolf
 S/PC - Mr. Cargo
 - Mr. Armacost
 - Mr. Seligmann
 H - Ambassador Torbert
 WH - Mr. Ehrlichman
 NSC - Mr. Lehman
 DOD - Mr. French
 - Mr. Knauer
 CIA [redacted]
 NSA [redacted]

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At various times during the session, Senators Symington,
 Fulbright, Aiken, Cooper and Gore were in attendance.

Senator Symington opened the hearing with a statement
 on the status of the transcript of the Subcommittee's hearing
 on Laos. He said that the situation was getting absurd; that

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there was practically nothing said in the hearings that hasn't been said on the floor of the Senate or reported in the press. He also complained of Ambassador Godley's alleged comment about the reporters who had inspected an air base in Laos.

Senator Symington left the hearings soon after they began and turned the questioning over to Counsel. Counsel asked about the security of U.S. facilities in Korea against sabotage and infiltration. He received an answer from a military witness that while there could be no guarantee against incidents, extensive security measures have been taken. He also asked about services provided to ROK forces by U.S. forces, such as in the area of communications. General Michaelis made the point that reduction in this area would require corresponding increases in MAP but conceded on questioning that Korean soldiers were less expensive than American soldiers.

Ambassador Porter was asked about the role of the Embassy in intelligence collection activities directed against North Korea. He explained that little is known about North Korea and that the issue is one of balancing

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possible intelligence gains against political risks. The Embassy made its views known on these matters, but decisions were made in Washington. He declined to go any further into the subject at this session.

Counsel asked about the circumstances in which the U.S. could remove its ground combat forces from Korea.

Ambassador Porter responded that as the Korean economy develops, which is now well under way, and if we envisaged an adequate program of modernization for the ROK army, and provided we intend no radical change in the terms of our commitment, he thought we could make some substantial reductions. He stated that the Koreans do look forward to standing on their own feet, although they will probably always desire some visible evidence of American companionship.

Counsel asked if any studies had been made on reduction of U.S. forces. Ambassador Brown responded that studies on this subject have been made from time to time and that the conclusion to date has been that the time for substantial reductions had not yet arrived.

Counsel asked why the size of the 4th Missile Command had been increased in recent years and ascertained that munitions for this unit were stored at Camp McMillan, 24

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miles from the DMZ. He asked specifically if these were facilities for nuclear weapons storage, to which General Michaelis replied that he had been instructed by the Secretary of Defense not to discuss this subject.

At this point Senator Fulbright, who had recently joined the hearing, took up the questioning.

Senator Fulbright asked the witnesses to specifically describe the instructions they had received. With respect to the category of "contingency plans" Senator Fulbright stated that the committee had difficulty accepting the idea that an agreement signed by a foreign defense minister is "a contingency plan" for this purpose, but that with respect to internal war plans "we accept that." Senator Fulbright asked if there were any agreements with Korea of a project Taksin-type to which General Michaelis replied in the negative.

Returning to the question of nuclear weapons, Senator Fulbright asked for letters from the Secretaries of State and Defense explaining why the committee should not be given information on the stationing of nuclear weapons abroad. He emphasized that such stationing could have an important effect on foreign relations and that there was involved here

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a "fundamental constitutional question of whether the State Department and the Pentagon are absolute masters or whether Congress has a role."

Senator Fulbright attempted to test the limits of the witnesses instructions by asking them to speculate about the political implications of stationing nuclear weapons abroad, whether the matter had been discussed with President Park, what the Korean Government's attitude was, etc. The witnesses declined to go into these questions. Senator Fulbright stated that at the time of the PUEBLO incident he had received a full briefing at the White House which included information on the stationing of nuclear weapons in Korea. He asked why there had been a change in policy. No witness was able to respond to this question.

Senator Fulbright also emphasized that he did not wish to be faced with any effort to delete this discussion of the witnesses' instructions. At this point Counsel read into the record a series of questions on the stationing of nuclear weapons in Korea.

The next major topic was propaganda directed against North Korea. The committee was told that the basic purpose of the VUNC program was to counteract North Korean propaganda

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to their own people about conditions in the South. Senator Fulbright referred to a newspaper report that Under Secretary Richardson had recommended the discontinuance of VUNC. Ambassador Porter acknowledged that he had participated in the recommendation; General Michaelis acknowledged that his predecessor -- as 8th Army Commander -- had recommended that VUNC be retained. Ambassador Porter explained his recommendation simply on the ground that VUNC activities duplicated South Korean information efforts and that there was thus an opportunity to save some money. Senator Fulbright complimented Ambassador Porter on his recommendation.

The discussion turned to U.S. policy regarding the reunification of Korea. After some initial confusion about our policy regarding relations between North and South, Ambassador Porter explained that we have been urging the South Koreans to look for areas of dialogue with the North but that this initiative had not been warmly received because of the constant barrage of threats against the South. Again Senator Fulbright complimented the Ambassador but complained that he had to draw this out and that the Ambassador should not be so modest about his work.

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The final major topic of discussion was the activities of Radio of Free Asia. Senator Fulbright stated his objection to the fact that the parent organization of ROFA enjoyed a tax exemption, and that the U.S. Government was thus in effect subsidizing its activities, while these activities constituted propaganda in behalf of a foreign government and undercut U.S. policy to boot. He read into the record the extravagant claims that the solicitation letter for ROFA made as to the responsibility of the Chinese Communists for dope, pornography, campus riots, the Black Panthers and sundry other domestic ills. Ambassador Brown stated that the Department shared Senator Fulbright's concerns and has spoken both to the Koreans and to the IRS.

Senator Fulbright closed with an admonition that the State Department keep a careful watch on all of the various means by which foreign governments propagandize in the U.S. because these activities have a real impact on the ability of the government to make foreign policy decisions, e.g. on aid, in a rational manner.

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